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ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

With the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the importance of vaccine development, distribution, and uptake
has come to the forefront of the public eye. Effectively fielding vaccines during an emergency—whether
that emergency is a result of an infectious disease or not—requires an understanding of usual vaccinerelated processes; the impact of outbreak, complex emergencies, mass gatherings, and other events on
patients, communities, and health systems; and ways in which diverse resources can be applied to
successfully achieve needed vaccine uptake. In this review, both the emergency setting and briefly
vaccine product design are discussed in these contexts in order to provide a concise source of general
knowledge from experts in fielding vaccines that can aid in future vaccine ventures and increase general
awareness of the process and barriers in various settings.
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Introduction
In light of the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the importance of
understanding the process and barriers to vaccine development,
distribution, and uptake is more important than ever.1 In order for
a vaccine to be available to any individual, it must be designed,
produced, validated, approved in the jurisdictions where it will be
used, manufactured to scale, delivered and staged, and ultimately
distributed, accepted, and administered to a population mobilized
to receive it. Intention is critical, with each aspect of making and
using a vaccine aligned to the use case, including the setting of use.
Most vaccines globally are administered in constrained settings
through established health services and public health programming. As such, vaccine design, manufacturing, delivery, and
uptake rely upon decades of experience by the health infrastructure as well as community patterns of accessing related services.
Certain settings, though, challenge assumptions, logistics, and
other operational realities on which effective vaccine use in populations depend. Among these are outbreaks, complex emergencies,
and mass gatherings. In this article, specific aspects of how such
settings impact vaccine-associated logistics are addressed.
There are substantial resource challenges in every setting.
Every community is faced with choices regarding how it will
apply its wealth and other resources to meet a goal. The richest
countries weigh a large breadth of resources against a broad
array of challenges that might be successfully met. The poorest
countries balance few resources against a broad array of unmet
challenges and a narrow list of accomplishable goals. These
dynamics do not diminish in an outbreak setting. Much
remains to be learned regarding how best to approach vaccine
use in any setting. Nonetheless, lessons exist that can help all of
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us improve the way that we plan for and employ vaccines,
regardless of setting. In this review, experts in fielding vaccines
provide these lessons learned to aid in future vaccine ventures
and increase general awareness of the process and barriers in
various settings.

Impact of the setting
Access
Access is perhaps the most well-recognized aspect of vaccine
readiness that differs between well-resourced and resourcelimited settings when faced with an emerging or reemerging
infectious disease threat. A wealthy country is more likely to
have established regulatory and commercial access to a vaccine
product, whether the vaccine is novel or existing. It may create the
vaccine, be able to both create and produce the vaccine with
available biomedical manufacturing infrastructure, or already be
positioned to procure the vaccine under existing, agreed overarching, or template contracts. The vaccine or its underlying
technology is more likely to already be known by regulatory
entities and so achieve emergency use authorization or licensure
quickly, depending upon the product, nature of the emergency,
and the jurisdiction. In contrast, a country with more limited
resources likely will not have an occasional use or novel vaccine
in stockpile. Furthermore, the country may not be able to produce
the vaccine quickly, even if the formulas for production are made
openly available, as a consequence of limited in-place technology
coupled with reagent availability. Additionally, while globally
more people reside in low-resource settings than high-resource
settings, high-resource settings are able to leverage wealth and
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existing commercial relationships to secure vaccines more effectively, outcompeting broader markets of need. A further complication greatly impacting novel vaccine distribution is export
control. Even if wealthy country manufacturing enables a ready
supply appropriate for global distribution, sovereign state interests
may restrict the ability to allow sufficient quantities of vaccine to
enter the global marketplace. All of these barriers to access translate to low-resourced countries waiting weeks to months for
vaccine supply after an outbreak is identified (Figure 1).
Vaccine access initiatives and partnerships
In the non-outbreak setting, strides have been made in vaccine
access against pervasive, cosmopolitan threats such as pediatric
pneumococcal disease.2 The Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunizations (GAVI) aims to provide vaccine access to children
in some of the lowest-resourced countries in the world.3 While
more work needs to be done with an estimated 500,000 children
aged <5 y dead from pneumococcal infections in 2015, GAVI and
others are making progress advancing use of the pneumococcal
vaccine around the world, incorporating financing innovations, as
well, to facilitate access.4 In other instances, public-private partnerships have formed to address concerns regarding the ability to
facilitate vaccine access to diverse countries. An example of this is
the Pox Protein Public-Private Partnership (P5) looking ahead to
a potential role for modified Vaccinia Ankara (MVA) in an antihuman immunodeficiency virus (HIV) global vaccine program5
and bringing potential shared aspects of production and distribution into product development discussions.

Analogous initiatives have occurred in the setting of pandemic-threat management as well. There is a renewed discussion internationally that would allow countries to augment
their internal regulatory systems with cooperative or international regulatory frameworks. The World Health Organization
(WHO) addressed the challenges of disease vigilance and
health-related regulatory processes in its 5-y action plan, and
it supports systems of assurance and pre-qualification.6 The
WHO led Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP)-Framework
was established in the aftermath of the 2009–10 influenza
A (H1N1) pandemic, where a combination of limited supply
and restricted purchasing and distribution of vaccines left lowresource afflicted countries perceiving that they had contributed to knowledge of and products against the pandemic without experiencing timely benefits of vaccine as they underwent
subsequent pandemic waves.7 The PIP Framework has succeeded in increasing transparency on how influenza viruses
that may be candidate seed strains for vaccine or research are
shared between qualified laboratories through its Influenza
Virus Traceability Mechanism and templates for sample
sharing.8 During the rise of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), another vaccine
access facilitating partnership arose between WHO, GAVI,
UNICEF, and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
Innovations (CEPI; a global partnership investment group for
advancing medical countermeasures against pandemic
threats). Referred to as COVAX, this partnership has facilitated
access to hundreds of millions of anti-SARS-CoV-2 vaccine
doses from various sources to at-risk countries of low

Figure 1. Timeline from outbreak onset to peak cases and launch of emergency vaccine campaign in low- to middle-income countries. Select outbreaks from low- to
middle-income countries demonstrating the often-lengthy delay in launching an emergency vaccine campaign after outbreak identification.56–64 Case peaks before
vaccine campaigns are able to launch or achieve high rates of delivery are common.
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Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, women in a small village in South Sudan volunteered to retrieve polio vaccines for the children in their village by traveling over 30 km
by foot.65 Credit: @whosouthsudan (with permission).

resource.9 Parallel, long-lived initiatives for pledged and physical stockpiling exist on a smaller scale against threats associated with outbreaks and epidemics—in particular, yellow
fever, cholera, and smallpox.10–12 Yellow fever provides an
example of how global supply can be very limited in contrast
to need even for well-established vaccines when the marketplace is insufficient to sustain large-scale production and supply, even when the product is considered generic and past most
patent protections.13 Well-resourced nations typically manage
their own national stockpiles that may feed as pledged doses
into global efforts, such as from the U.S. Strategic National
Stockpile.14 Bilateral relationships between countries also exist
in emergencies, often when the two countries share a common
history or current or aspirational commercial relationships.
Such sharing has also been employed in what is called soft
power, as part of how countries cultivate new or burgeoning
political and economic relationships, as has been reported in
the context of COVID-19 vaccines between China and
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, and others.15
Purchasing and gifting mechanisms are not the only global approaches to ensuring that vaccines are available to lowresource, at-risk countries. WHO has a pre-qualification
process that allows medical countermeasures eligibility for
the essential medicines list and other procurement programming by the organization.16 This process’s outputs are used
by some regulatory bodies in resource-challenged countries
to accelerate regulatory clearance. WHO’s Strategic Advisory
Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) influences both
global programs and country-level vaccine administration
policy recommendations by undertaking risk-benefit analyses
regarding what individuals in which settings ought to receive
a candidate vaccine in and out of emergencies.17 This has
direct effects on determinations of vaccine distribution to
different countries. The spread of SARS-CoV-2 and its
novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has led to renewed
calls for broader technology transfer to resource-challenged
countries so that they can manufacture and distribute their
own vaccines and ultimately design their own, as well. The

narratives by both advocates and industry have focused on
realities of both intellectual property and consequences to
how each country structures those systems. Achieving effective distributed production of locally important medical
countermeasures globally requires strategies for workforce
development, sustainable approaches to manufacturing that
address reagents, utilities such as power and clean water,
equipment management lifecycles, and other aspects essential
to good manufacturing practices.18

Access to routine vaccines
While much of this review focuses on issues of fielding timely
vaccine products in response to an emerging or reemerging infectious disease threat, both health and non-health emergencies also
significantly impact routine vaccination. Low access and uptake in
this context can be striking in crises involving refugees and internally displaced populations. A 2015 systematic review found uptake
of critical vaccine interventions such as tetanus in pregnancy as
low as 1:10 to 2:5 despite evidence of awareness by at-risk women
of the need.19 Why this is the case in emergent large, aggregate
settings is sometimes not obvious. To varying degrees, scale of
need relevant to both supply and distribution requirements, leveraging impromptu health service systems, and trust by vulnerable
persons toward the providers, registration systems, the vaccine,
and whether secondary gain by officials is present, all contribute to
the complexity of effectively delivering routine and emergent
vaccination in these settings. Natural and pandemic-threats disrupt routine vaccination of stable populations, as well. In the
United States (U.S.), a recent study of adherence among adolescents to recommendations from the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices, regularly convened by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), showed a marked decline
in routine, scheduled vaccinations lasting at least 3 months into the
COVID-19 pandemic.20 This was assessed by cataloging pediatric
prescriptions, and the authors attributed it to disruptions in routine healthcare access.
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In less well-resourced settings, such access disruptions can
lead to palpable increases in preventable deaths. An analysis of
routine, scheduled vaccinations in West Africa during the
2014–6 epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD) predicted up
to 16,000 excess measles deaths associated with decreased
healthcare access and, consequently, a 75% reduction in vaccination rates.21 Access issues linked to the decline in mitigation
measures, such as vitamin A repletion in malnourished settings
to prevent poor outcomes in measles, compounded the risk
reflected from these estimates. Distraction from epidemics
disrupts surveillance of routinely reported diseases, also, relevant to safe and effective vaccine programming. This occurred
with vaccine-derived polio in Guinea under pressure from
EVD.22 In both EVD and COVID-19, the application of healthcare precautions and societal measures to limit onward transmission impacted access. Wage loss, as well as shortages in fuel
and other aspects making transportation more difficult, exacerbated decreased ability and interest to take time to get
vaccinated. Diminished healthcare workforce from illness or
flight, patient reticence to engage healthcare settings because of
their association with the emergency, and those who are more
severely ill, all work together to impact how readily people seek
vaccination, and how successful they are in obtaining it when
sought. Natural threats such as earthquakes, flooding, rockslides, or community-wide pressures such as drought and
famine join these forces with potential mass migration, and
physical destruction of roads, healthcare facilities. Stop gap
measures as health services adjust to demands and adapt
around such challenges have included mobile vaccination
teams, rotating vaccine-focused clinics, distributed provision
of vaccine services by community health aides, and other
extended providers in concert with robust risk communication
and social mobilization, incorporating community leadership
and diverse stakeholders, such as traditional healers.

Vaccine access during complex emergencies and mass
gatherings
Complex emergencies add both dispersed and organized violence intended to disrupt stability, encourage participation and
fealty of noncombatants, or act against perceived alliances
between combatants and health initiatives. An International
Committee of the Red Cross report cites 64 attacks against
persons implementing vaccine programming in 2013, affecting
internationally deployed and local healthcare workers alike.23
A relationship between violence in eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and EVD case rates during their
recent epidemic has been established.24 Access to screening,
case finding, and vaccination all likely contributed to this effect,
through a combination of direct decline in availability of services and the indirect effects of potential retaliation. Despite
the existence of a safe and effective Ebola vaccine on site,
violence in Beni, DRC, in 2019 halted vaccination and dropped
traceable case contacts from 9:10 to less than 1:5.25 Strategies to
interrupt violence as a factor in public health emergency
response as well as health maintenance programming require
persistent multi-stakeholder engagement requiring whole-ofsociety participation.

Additionally, mass gatherings pose their own unique challenges to vaccine access. Mass gatherings are sometimes anticipated like the Hajj pilgrimage or planned and scheduled events
such as the World Cup, but unplanned ones, such as during
population migrations from regular droughts in the Sahel or
from an escalating conflict, also exist. The principal challenge
in these settings is scale, the presence of need accumulated over
a much shorter period than in place services evolved to support
a much lower density of access. For planned events, organizers
can encourage participants to use their access at home to
complete vaccination prior to attending them. The ability to
travel and even venue ticket purchase can be contingent upon
having done so. Saudi Arabia communicates specific requirements for entry to participate with the Hajj and Umrah, for
instance.26 For unplanned but anticipated events, particularly
those associated with migration, services can target transportation routes so that the burden of access is de-densified.
Unfortunately, regular human migration due to drought in
the Sahel has long been associated with vaccine-relevant health
services gaps and vulnerability.27 Even large human migrations
may have very distinct features by location that matter for
planning and execution of vaccine campaigns. Bidirectional
flow of internally displaced persons between United Nations
camps and their points of origin are the norm in South Sudan,
while more limited bidirectional flow occurs among
Palestinians to and from Jordan and the occupied territories
and among Mexicans and other Latin Americans across the
U.S.-Mexico border. In contrast, unidirectional flow from subSaharan Africa east into the Middle East and north through the
Sahara are common.28 Each instance impacts the ability of
healthcare workers to attempt more than one encounter with
any given migrant.
The international disaster response health services cluster is
often relied upon to advise or execute the many ways to provision surge healthcare access. Whether for contingency or event
planning or response to a sudden event, preparation for such
action requires substantial lead time.
Storage and distribution
Depending upon the threat, vaccine stockpiles may exist in
a physical form managed by the WHO or other international
actor, in virtual form where vaccines are either present or
anticipated in various sourcing national and nongovernmental stockpiles, or already distributed to at-risk settings. Aspects of the product itself and human use regulatory
requirements that influence this are discussed in a later section.
The administration of stockpiles and their delivery is complex.
Barriers include the process of procurement; the need to construct sharing agreements and consider aspects of liability;
managing requirements imposed by the products’ lifecycle
such as production timing, cold chain, and expiration dates;
storage needs at every level of distribution; intercontinental,
regional, and sub-regional transportation that may include air,
sea, and ground transportation; customs requirements and
handling; and delays in advising or ensuring receiving at-risk
countries’ logistical readiness. Fortunately, global experiences
with polio, smallpox, yellow fever, and more recently cholera
and pandemic influenza A (H1N1) vaccination campaigns
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provided robust experience to many stakeholders on both the
delivery and receiving end of getting vaccines to communities.
While equitable access and distribution continue to be
a struggle against every threat, and it can seem like systems
get reinvented in each emergency to make storage and distribution happen, the substrate for effective management is present. Adaptive mechanisms for more recent responses to EVD
and COVID-19 like COVAX relied upon experienced, in place
logistics partners such as GAVI, WHO, UNICEF, World Food
Program, and catalyzing influences such as from CEPI.
Another important step in global logistics in at-risk settings
happened under the U.S. President’s Emergency Program for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Dry, cool, and cold storage requirements for available antiretroviral therapy in the early 2000s
coupled with diverse in-country distribution needs resulted in
a deliberate program focus on logistical aspects of provisioning
therapy. This led to investments in dispersed pharmaceuticalappropriate storage, as well as training and mentored inventory
and distribution management relationships. While PEPFAR
countries represented a subset of those globally with need, it
helped to enculturate the importance of expressly incorporating logistics in public health services planning in at-risk settings beyond exigent emergency response.
Despite these gains in experience and infrastructure, public
health logistics innovation remains needed at every level of
resource. In the U.S., those in low resource, rural areas are
less likely to obtain influenza vaccines unless it is through the
established setting of a clinician’s visit as opposed to more
innovative approaches such as pharmacies, churches, and
workplaces.29 While many U.S. studies focus on whether residents obtain vaccines or not, key components to their ability to
get vaccines are having the infrastructure and systems in place
to distribute and store them, together with a sufficient number
of trained professionals to administer the vaccines. When three
major hurricanes devastated Puerto Rico in 2017, more than
2 million USD in vaccines were lost because of power outages
or structural damage (Personal Communication, 2021). Since
that time, the Puerto Rico Department of Health has sought to
build capacity in vaccine administration through purchase and
distribution of additional refrigeration equipment and generators, creation of storage facilities and an extensive Vaccine
Storage Network (VSN), and recruitment and training of
health care providers and pharmacists to increase the availability of vaccines across the islands. With their efforts, the
VSN extended access from eight regional centers for vaccine
storage to nearly 70, so that residents in even the most rural
locations would be served. This work was completed just as the
COVID-19 vaccine became available to residents.
Consequently, delivery of new vaccine to patients could be
accomplished far more quickly than even non-emergency circumstances. This system contributed to Puerto Rico leading
the country in vaccine completion rates (78% fully vaccinated
compared to 63% nationwide).30
Distributing small-scale logistics centers together with vaccine delivery is an approach used in outbreaks and mass gatherings, as well. Fielding a resource effectively requires applying
it where it has value, and so placement must be matched to
where meeting need is feasible and ideally sustainable. Solar-
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powered cold storage in Yemen, for instance, re-enabled routine vaccination programs in several locales after 5 y of conflict
had made uncertain power the norm.31
Information management is an often under-appreciated
aspect of effective vaccine logistics. Systems for this fulfill
three key functions: (1) active management of operational
execution; (2) successful planning through demand forecasting, supply-chain gap-analysis, and time-studies; and, (3) quality assurance, adverse reaction reporting, and follow-up
tracking. This last element is an increasingly important tool
to counter vaccine disinformation. Effectively linking vaccine
manufacturer information to a chain-of-custody that connects
vaccine origin, destination, and recipient is particularly difficult when existing healthcare system information management
infrastructure cannot be relied upon. Additional quality assurance requirements such as temperature records for each process step, tracking who participates in the process and how,
material inspection reports, and other information makes
achieving a good understanding of vaccine safety and performance in unconstrained settings that much more difficult.
Both manufacturers and public health agencies have vested
interests in thorough vaccine quality assurances throughout
the vaccine supply-chain and processes. Also, rapid and accurate vaccine-related adverse reaction investigations are increasingly critical as each vaccine recipient’s social media claims can
quickly become a flashpoint for spreading disinformation and
vaccine-hesitancy. Among surveyed persons who declined
rVSV-EBOV vaccination in the Democratic Republic of
Congo 2018 Ebola virus disease epidemic, three in four
expressed insufficient awareness of risks and benefits.32 There
are initiatives to field digitized solutions to immunization
registries in low- and middle-income countries.33
Measures to overcome logistics challenges in locales with
limited health infrastructure sometimes incorporate “greenfield” operational footprints. These are entirely parent organization owned logistics networks and information
management systems dropped into an area of need. While
this approach may succeed in alleviating outside-of-country
stakeholder concerns regarding the feasibility of a vaccine
program, there are drawbacks to this approach. High costs
and delays in deployment are common. Donor fatigue
occurs. Additionally, host countries can view the effort as
undermining their sovereignty. In practice, such efforts
rarely bring all required assets, equipment, personnel, and
support structures to deliver vaccine autonomously. Instead,
a significant number of local resources, vendors, and healthcare staff become co-opted into processes. Because the
intent is to act separately, it ironically can yield unfortunate
consequences for the local healthcare system, which experiences personnel absenteeism, vendor service levels and
availability drop, and prices increase above market norms
to conform with international organization price-points.
Vaccine delivery in the DRC against EVD has pivoted
away from “greenfield” vaccine operations, empowering
advocates of more local approaches to African COVID-19
vaccination, believing that leveraged rather than co-opted
community health infrastructure can extend reach and
delivery of vaccines.34
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Personnel, supplies, and equipment necessary for implementing vaccine programming are subject to the same security challenges as those who live and work in the communities
they seek to service. Complex emergencies may require
increasing security measures for personnel, facilities, and
transit. This must be balanced against exacerbating perceptions that vaccine efforts represent a particular side to conflict. Effective measures may be hard or soft – they might
include increased vigilance, careful scheduling, limiting dispersed stockpiling, or unobtrusive escorts. However, whatever security mechanics are employed, they must be deescalatory in nature and facilitate, not diminish opportunities for access to the vaccine. Accords facilitating vaccine
access can be reached and may be served by broadening the
stakeholders in the conversation such as faith and other
community leaders whose influence may span conflicting
parties.
Uptake issues
Well-considered frameworks on promoting vaccine acceptance
and demand exist, applicable to routine and emergency settings alike.35–37 These frameworks acknowledge that a wide
mix of factors come together to yield vaccine uptake, namely
perceived disease risk, vaccine confidence, social norms, presence of trusted broker reinforcement, an individual sense of
right to access care as might be impacted by gender and
minority equity issues, practical aspects of access such as direct
and indirect costs (e.g., travel time, lost work), availability, and
nature of the relationship the individual has with health systems generally and specifically related to the vaccine. In impoverished settings, stark realities of hunger may compete with
attempts to demonstrate the need for vaccines.38
Outbreaks, complex emergencies, and mass gatherings are
sources of uncertainty at every step of an individual’s decisionmaking as to whether or not to seek and receive a vaccine. Even
after overcoming the hurdles of receiving and storing supplies
on-site, launching a campaign does not always equate to high
uptake, potentially limiting the vaccine’s impact on curbing
cases in these situations (Figure 1). The very nature of the
threat often is not broadly understood—when a threat is new,
people lack a frame of reference to appreciate consequences of
a lack of vigilance. And, over time, appreciation of risk can
become fatigued. A recent U.S. survey revealed persistent
COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy among younger persons (less
than age 55) and those less educated, while also showing
relatively increased hesitancy among some minority
groups.39,40
In established communities in outbreaks and complex emergencies, norms regarding vaccination are unseated by the event.
In mass gatherings, this is further complicated by a large, new
set of communities that have not had time to establish norms
relevant to emergency health services. Emergencies and movement away from usual support systems may exacerbate a sense
of unworthiness or fear. Complex emergencies have the added
challenge of combatant-applied pressure on whether participation in a vaccine campaign is an act of allegiance, which could
be punishable. One example of this is Boko Haram’s hindrance
of polio vaccination in Nigeria,41 purportedly employing

violence against both healthcare workers and recipients. Old
wounds from imperialism of the global north into the global
south complicates such discussions, providing a ready retreat
from willingness to accept pandemic-threat solutions from
those who are not trusted by local communities.
Taken together, there is a danger in over attributing
individual reticence regarding the nature of the vaccine itself
or the threat as a reason for low vaccine uptake. Aspects like
those discussed in the previous sections that make it possible
to freely consider taking a vaccine must be addressed for
a vaccine campaign to succeed. However, open, multistakeholder deliberation that acknowledges what is known
and not known, and is clear when information has changed,
is recommended.42,43

Designing vaccine products that enhance access,
storage and distribution, and uptake
When considering what aspects of the setting and use case
should be incorporated in design approaches for vaccines
employed in emergencies, the obvious ones are the most
important. Deployed vaccines must be both safe and effective
in meeting aims that are well articulated. However, additional
design elements can ease logistical burdens.
Approaches to formulation drive many facets of logistics.
While cold chain capabilities are more widely distributed
than often realized, the mRNA platform −80°C requirements
for COVID-19 vaccination posed several challenges.44
However, availability of doses to resource-limited settings
had more to do with alternative vaccine approaches than
cold chain capability. Furthermore, strain on the amount of
−80°C storage was ameliorated by later stability testing as
more experience with related products was gained. However,
the environmental conditions most conducive to broad distribution should be considered so that early assessment of
stability as well as lyophilization, freeze-drying, and other
approaches as relevant to the fielded vaccine technology can
be fully explored.45
When useful for magnitude of immunogenicity, immune
compartment effects, dose sparing, vaccine acceptability, or
other practical aspects of delivery, mechanism of administering the vaccine should be further elaborated early in the
development process. Yellow fever vaccine availability
through stockpiling has required rationing in recent years.
However, in both emergency setting and longitudinal assessment, one-fifth fractional doses administered intradermally
have been shown to provide similar neutralizing antibody
levels to full dose intramuscular administration.46–48 Oral
administration of cholera vaccine has enabled widely distributed, rapid deployment with a diverse workforce as well as
high uptake.49
The ability to manufacture vaccine rapidly in diverse settings
has been a topic of discourse in the COVID-19 pandemic and
other recent high-profile epidemics that preceded it.50
Technologies offer promise of rapid adaptability, though
being able to transfer technology requires a broad spectrum
of workforce, utilities and technology-associated infrastructure,
reagent and other supply, commercial, and regulatory investments. National interests may contribute into these challenges
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through export controls and competitive purchasing.51,52
Common narratives blaming patent protections belie this constellation of barriers that can be met methodically. If the deeper
issues are solved, companies and governments could license
manufacture of emergency products. One piece of such
a solution is the Medicines Patent Pool, a United Nationsbacked activity that seeks increase development and distribution of medicines in low- and middle-income countries
(LMIC). Partnering with civil society, industry, patient groups,
international organizations, and governments, it facilitates
cooperative work through shared intellectual property and
licensing.53 Industry partners have used this mechanism in
the COVID-19 pandemic.54,55
Product manufacturers tend to consider the regulatory
space as an extrinsic factor. However, disclosing development plans, early engagement of regulatory stakeholders,
honest, rolling evaluations and communications of results
anchored in use case and avoiding corporate or agency
success branding, and stepwise explanations for why successive levels of regulatory clearance are being sought could
help a transparency agenda and aid risk communication.

Summary
In addition to baseline population health, vaccine access,
storage and distribution strategy, and factors impacting
vaccine uptake are all key facets of any setting where use
of a vaccine is indicated. Outbreaks, complex emergencies,
mass gatherings, and other resource-stretching events introduce challenges to how each of these aspects of vaccine
programming are executed. Lessons from prior emergencies
and opportunities in vaccine, support system, and program
design all assist developers and operational implementers
alike in attaining results through vaccination. However,
efforts must be deliberate, involve broad stakeholders, and
start as early as possible in order to ensure the broadest
utility when opportunities to intervene on disease transmission may be limited.
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